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Executive Summary
For many years the European Union’s growth model has been to find new markets for the 
products and services it is able to produce cheaper and better than most other countries. This 
model is under pressure. The number of under-exploited markets is shrinking, while new 
competitors emerge quickly, challenging the comparative advantage of the EU even in higher 
value added goods and services. To secure growth and jobs in Europe, it is likely to be nec-
essary to move to a new growth model built on developing emerging sectors with high value 
added. But in which sectors can Europe grow, and what economic policies would work? 
We propose a general approach that can be used to prioritise policies based on quantitative-
ly localising sectors and regions with measurable growth potential. Sectors can be identified 
based on recent and expected growth of their global markets and the technology dynamics. 
We assess the potential of countries to excel in these emerging sectors based on their current 
export specialisation in this sector. This revealed comparative advantage indicates whether 
a country is better able than others to compete in this particular field. But even if a country 
is not yet specialised in a certain sector it might develop a comparative advantage over time, 
especially if the sector is based on rapid innovation. We thus propose to identify whether 
countries are particularly specialised in innovating in the identified sector based on patent 
data. Finally, certain sectors have commonalities. Even if a country is currently not good at 
exporting and patenting in a certain sector, it might easily acquire this capability if it is strong 
in nearby sectors. So we propose to also investigate the strength of countries in sectors found 
to be close to the identified sector, as a proxy for whether the country might have the poten-
tial to develop a comparative advantage in the identified sector.
Given global decarbonisation concerns, the wide array of low-carbon technologies 
offers significant growth potential. Some EU countries have already been able to develop a 
comparative advantage in wind turbines and electric vehicles, though the EU is less effective 
at exporting solar panels and batteries. Based on patenting activities we, however, see some 
potential – maybe not for entire countries but for some regions – to further specialise in all of 
these four low-carbon technologies. 
A regional overview is valuable because it can help in targeting public investment (eg 
in infrastructure, research and education) to enable development in the most promising 
sectors/regions.
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Introduction
The European Commission’s call in 2014 for a European Industrial Renaissance1 stressed that 
Europe urgently needs to lay the foundations for post-crisis growth and the modernisation 
of its industry. However, European policymakers are struggling to identify economic policies 
that can create new jobs and return their economies to a stable growth path.
The aim of this report is to examine how Europe can gain a competitive edge in new 
products and services with higher value added that can form the basis for future growth and 
jobs. In light of limited fiscal and political capital, the crucial issue is prioritisation in terms of 
technologies, regions and policies. 
This report is organised as follows. In the first section we argue that in order to achieve 
long-term growth goals, policymakers should focus on those sectors that provide products 
and services characterised by growth potential and high value added, rather than those ‘tra-
ditional’ sectors where demand is often saturated and that face increasing competition from 
both incumbents and new players. In the second section we line out that especially after the 
Paris Agreement, in which 195 countries agreed to limit greenhouse gas emissions, low-car-
bon technologies represent a highly relevant area on which policymakers and investors might 
concentrate their attention. Hence we focus on four particular low-carbon technologies: 
electric vehicles, wind turbines, energy storage and photovoltaic generation. 
These technologies are characterised by increasing exports and investment, making them 
appealing and promising areas in which additional investment in innovation could generate 
promising returns in the future. 
In the third and fourth sections we show which European countries already have a 
comparative advantage in one or more of these four different technologies, and which might 
develop an advantage in the future, by building on their technological specialisation in 
related fields. 
We then provide in the fifth section quantitative criteria to identify the regions within 
countries on which efforts would be concentrated, in order to take advantage of the geo-
graphical spillovers from existing industrial regional clusters. 
In the concluding section, we summarise the four criteria we used to identify promis-
ing specialisation avenues and provide policy recommendations how to prioretise policies 
accordingly.
Setting the scene: from quantity to                      
quality-based growth
Policymakers in the EU and elsewhere are concerned about jobs and growth. Growth is about 
generating higher value added2. There are essentially two strategies to increase the value 
added a country produces:
• Quantity: Producing more of the same. The problem with a quantity strategy is that mar-
gins for existing products tend to be squeezed for two reasons. First, there is saturation. 
When everybody owns a TV, the willingness to pay for a second TV, or even a better model, 
1  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, For a European Industrial Renaissance (COM/2014/014 final).
2  To be clear, we write here about long-term growth prospects and not about short-term macroeconomic discussions 
on whether the slow recovery is an issue of secular stagnation (saving > investment), a liquidity trap or debt overhang. 
It might be related to Gordon (2012).
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keeps reducing. Second there is competition. If a product is successful, more and more 
other producers will produce the same, increasing competition. An effective quantity strat-
egy thus requires the constant opening up of new markets (either new consumers within 
the domestic market, or new export markets).
• Quality: Producing new products and services with higher value added. Disruptive new 
products and services can provide substantial margins for first movers. Moreover, agglom-
eration effects entail the possibility to extend the first-mover advantage in one technology 
to a whole ecosystem of related new products and services. The classic example of such 
virtuous agglomeration is Silicon Valley.
The EU was able to rely for a long time on a quantity-based growth strategy, in particular 
by supplying the emerging central and eastern European countries and China. However, 
growth in those countries is slowing and they no longer demand an ever-increasing volume 
of Europe’s current export products and services. The emerging economies now export to the 
world many of the goods Europe was previously good at exporting. So even if Europe could 
hope for the emergence of other economies, such as Iran or in Africa, margins are falling 
because of increasing competition. China in particular managed to rapidly develop the com-
plexity of its exports and to compete with developed economies in export markets for quite 
sophisticated goods.
Two observations illustrate this increasing competition in markets that were dominated 
by western countries two decades ago. First, there has been a notable convergence in the 
complexity of products exported by western and eastern countries. The Economic Complexity 
Indicator (ECI) developed by Harvard’s Center for International Development3 ranks how 
diversified and complex countries’ export baskets are based on their diversity (how many dif-
ferent products each country can produce) and the ubiquity of those products (the number of 
countries able to make those products4). For almost all of the more than 100 ranked countries 
the indicator is between -2.5 and +2.5. In 2014, the ECI score for the United States was 1.36 
and 1.10 for China. For EU countries5 it ranges from 0.22 for Greece and 1.92 for Germany. 
The most striking observation is the rapid increase in the complexity of Chinese exports. 
While ranked below Bulgaria in 2000, China had surpassed Denmark and Belgium by 2014. 
Over the same period, the US and major EU economies gradually lost some of their advantage 
as new players – including from central and eastern Europe – started to export products that 
were previously only exported by the most-developed countries. This signals that incumbent 
exporters face increasing competitive pressure (see also Box 1).
Table 1: Economic complexity indicator
USA China Germany France Spain UK Poland Hungary
1995 2.05 0.21 2.65 1.94 1.40 2.05 0.80 0.99
2014 1.36 1.10 1.92 1.29 0.82 1.48 0.93 1.50
Change                     
1995-2014
-34% 424% -28% -34% -41% -28% 16% 52%
Source: CID.
3  http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings/.
4  Consequently, the ECI is a relative indicator. That is, it might go down even if the country does not change its export 
basket, as soon as other countries start to also export some of those products.
5  The rankings do not cover Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta.
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Box 1: EU exports are in product markets that are under competitive pressure
To further illustrate the point highlighted by Table 1, we made an assessment for the prod-
ucts that are mainly produced in a limited number of countries. As a criterion we used the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures the concentration of suppliers in a 
market6. If a certain product category is only exported by a single country, it has an HHI of 
10,000. If the product category has an equal share in the exports of 100 countries, the HHI 
for this product category is 100. A high HHI means that only a few countries export this 
product and the few exporters might have some market power, ie the ability to extract some 
extra margin by demanding a price that significantly exceeds the cost. For illustration, we 
chose an HHI threshold of 4000. If we count the number of product categories with an HHI 
above 4000 for all major economies, we find that the US exports many products that only a 
few countries export, while China – despite its significantly greater share of global exports – 
exports fewer products that are only exported from a limited number of countries. The EU’s 
global export market share is almost a quarter larger than that of the US, but compared to 
the US, the EU only exports 11 more products that are only exported by a limited number of 
players. So while the US seems to strongly focus on quality exports, China’s export strategy is 
focused on quantity, while EU is in between.
Figure 1: Number of high HHI product categories exported, selected economies
Source: Bruegel based on Comtrade.
Second, the transformation of China into an economy that can compete with incumbent 
exporters is impressively illustrated by the change in its export basket. While in 1990, elec-
tric machinery already made up 10 percent of German and 12 percent of US exports, it only 
accounted for 6 percent of Chinese exports. By 2015, electric machinery had become the 
backbone of Chinese exports, accounting for a quarter of the country’s huge foreign sales. 
At the same time the US – after a surge around the year 2000 – dramatically shifted its export 
focus away from electric machinery to other products. 
Europe’s growth for a long time rested on finding new markets for its incumbent export 
industry. German car exports are a striking example of this development. The share of road 
vehicles in German gross exports grew from 12 percent in 1965 to 15 percent in 2010 and to 
18 percent in 2015. German export-based industry is thus extremely vulnerable to just one 
single product. So far, China (and other emerging countries) remains a sleeping dragon. But 
if China7 – which has developed a significant car industry for the massive domestic market 
6  The HHI is the sum of the squared market share of all competitors. 
7  In Annex 5 we provide a nice illustration of how China moved up the export value chain from bicycles, to motorcy-
cles, to vehicles.
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(25 million cars per year8) – manages to increase the share of cars in its export basket from 
the current 3 percent at the same pace as it did for electric machinery, the German economy 
would come under massive pressure.
Figure 2: Export specialisations of China, Germany and the US
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade. Note: trade categories for road vehicles changed slightly between 1970 and 1980.
The natural conclusion would be that to keep growing in the longer term, Europe should 
embrace a growth strategy that develops and exports new products and services. But to date, 
Europe seems ill equipped to move away from incumbent sectors that could come under 
pressure from competition from emerging countries. While Europe hosted most of the world 
leaders in the disruptive technologies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such 
as manufacturers of railways and trains, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electrical appliances 
and cars, it seems to have fallen behind in terms of the disruptive technologies of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, such as electronics, computers and software. A 
look at the largest non-financial companies by market value seems to confirm this. In early 
2016, there were only seven EU companies among the 50 largest in the world, and the average 
year of their incorporation was 1913 (compared to 1943 in the US and 1964 in the rest of the 
world). The five largest companies in the world are all US companies, and four of them are IT 
companies formed after 1975.
What can Europe do to gain a competitive edge in new products and services with higher 
value added, which will form the basis for future growth and jobs? As fiscal and political capi-
tal is limited, the crucial issue is prioritisation of policies9. Our aim is to provide some criteria 
to help decide which policies (at which level of government) could have the largest aggregate 
impact on growth by resolving growth-bottlenecks for individual sectors and regions. We 
suggest a four-step approach:
1. Identify promising sectors
To support the transition to new sectors, policymakers need to have an idea of the destina-
tion they want to reach. This is because different sectors require different policies: supporting 
bulky machinery with geographically disbursed value chains (eg wind turbines or electric 
vehicles) might primarily require investment in transport infrastructure, while developing 
new services (eg sharing platforms or electricity demand aggregators) might primarily require 
deep changes to outdated regulations, and smart appliances (eg smart meters) might primar-
8  According to the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, 25 million vehicles were sold in China in 2015, of 
which 41 percent were a Chinese brand: http://www.caam.org.cn/AutomotivesStatistics/20160120/1305184264.html.
9 See also i24c (2016) Scaling Up innovation in the Energy union to meet climate, competitiveness and societal goals, 
i24c for a wider discussion on the need for Europe to prioritise its funding support and align policies.
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ily require investment in research and education. Technology selection should not be driven 
by incumbent players, but by potential, in the sense of the possible contribution of the tech-
nology to future growth and the as-yet untapped potential for a country/region to thrive in 
this sector. We present in the next section some criteria to evaluate the possible contribution 
of sectors to future growth: namely technology and export market dynamics, and expected 
future market size. From a growth perspective, there is little value in investing public money 
in interesting, but barely-marketable technologies, such as nuclear fusion.
2. Identify the appropriate regions
Strength in new products and services is typically built on pre-existing strengths. This 
might be direct spillovers from existing strengths (eg using an existing customer base, logistics 
or knowledge), but could also be very indirect spillovers from specialisation cycles of regions 
or entire countries. In practice we observe ecosystems of companies, infrastructure, educa-
tion facilities, financial institutions, regulations and so on, that contribute to the favouring of 
a certain sector. The classic example is Silicon Valley, but there are also examples in the EU, 
such as the automotive cluster in south-west Germany or the chemical industry cluster in 
Belgium. Supporting any new sector is therefore most promising in countries/regions that 
already have some of the elements of success present. In this paper we identify countries and 
regions that might have the potential to grow in one of the four low-carbon technologies we 
focus on.
3. Identify the barriers
What holds back a country or region from developing/exploiting its competitive edge in a 
growing technology? Finding the true bottleneck is important because otherwise policymak-
ers risk deploying valuable resources to non-issues. Shortcomings in, for example, education, 
infrastructure or regulation, can be overcome within a certain time period; while other areas 
such as the cost of capital, labour or energy can often not be addressed in a neutral way (we 
would strongly advise against permanent subsidies that change the relative factor cost for 
certain sectors). This step is not addressed in the present study.
4. Identify the policies to overcome the barriers
The final step is to identify the right policy and layer of government to remove barriers. 
This involves comparing different policy options and conducting cost-benefit analyses. Poli-
cies that deliver only limited benefits at excessive cost should obviously not be deployed.
It is very important to highlight again that policy interventions should be as ‘horizontal’ as 
possible. That is, they should not be targeted at individual companies (let alone incumbents) 
and should not grant benefits only to ‘desired’ sectors. 
Policymakers should only obtain a tool to strategically prioritise public investments and 
regulatory reforms that are in anyway meaningful. That is, a reform or public investment 
should not only be conducted to help one particular sector (eg granting tax exemptions or 
providing exclusive infrastructure) – let alone to intentionally disfavour other sectors, but it 
should be sensible beyond the sector.
The final step in designing any good policy should be evaluation in order to fine-tune 
future implementation10.
10  Our approach closely relates to the smart specialisation strategy which builds on the fact that different countries 
and regions tend to specialise in different sectors, depending on their capabilities and industrial structure (Mc-
Cann-Argilés, 2015). Therefore, in order to promote regional growth by strengthening links between the R&D capabil-
ities and the industrial structure of each region, no ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy can be identified; rather, tailored actions 
have to be studied at the local level (David et al, 2009). In this context, energy plays an important role, and the Smart 
Specialisation Platform on Energy (S3PEnergy) has been created to make better use of Cohesion Funds to support the 
EU’s energy policy priorities.
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Table 2: 50 largest non-financial companies according to market capitalisation, 
2016
Company Country
Year 
Est. 
Sector
Market value 
($ billions)
Apple US 1976 Computer Hardware 586
Alphabet/google US 1998 Computer Services 500.1
Microsoft US 1975 Software & Programming 407
ExxonMobil US 1881 Oil & Gas Operations 363.3
Facebook US 2004 Computer Services 314.8
Johnson & Johnson US 1886
Medical Equipment & 
Supplies
312.6
Amazon.com US 1994 Internet Retail 292.6
General Electric US 1892 Conglomerates 285.6
China Mobile China 1997
Telecommunications 
services
241
Nestle Switzerland 1866 Food Processing 235.7
AT&T US 1983
Telecommunications 
services
234.2
Roche Holding Switzerland 1896 Pharmaceuticals 222.2
Procter & Gamble US 1837 Household/Personal Care 218.9
Wal-Mart Stores US 1962 Discount Stores 215.7
Royal Dutch Shell Netherlands 1890 Oil & Gas Operations 210
Verizon 
Communications
US 1983
Telecommunications 
services
206.2
Pfizer US 1849 Pharmaceuticals 205.7
Anheuser-Bush 
InBev
Belgium 1852 Beverages 204.6
PetroChina China 1999 Oil & Gas Operations 203.8
Novartis Switzerland 1996 Pharmaceuticals 203.8
Alibaba China 1999 Internet Retail 200.7
Tencent Holdings China 1998 Computer Services 197.4
Coca-Cola US 1886 Beverages 192.8
Chevron US 1879 Oil & Gas Operations 192.3
Toyota Japan 1937
Auto & Truck 
Manufacturers
177
Home Depot US 1978 Home Improvement Retail 169.8
Walt Disney US 1923 Broadcasting & Cable 169.3
Oracle US 1977 Software & Programming 168.9
Samsung 
Electronics
South Korea 1969 Semiconductors 161.6
Merck US 1891 Pharmaceuticals 157.2
Phillip Morris 
International
US 1923 Tobacco 150.3
Intel US 1968 Semiconductors 149.3
Comcast US 1963 Broadcasting & Cable 148.2
PepsiCo US 1898 Beverages 147.3
Novo Nordisk Denmark 1923 Pharmaceuticals 144.9
IBM US 1911 Computer Services 142.7
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Cisco Systems US 1984
Communications 
Equipment
141.7
Gilead Sciences US 1988 Biotech 138.1
Unilever Netherlands 1930 Food Processing 137.2
UnitedHealth group US 1977 Managed Health Care 127.5
Taiwan 
Semiconductor
Taiwan 1987 Semiconductors 125.6
Amgen US 1980 Biotech 122.4
Total France 1924 Oil & Gas Operations 121.9
Altria Group US 1985 Tobacco 118.4
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb
US 1887 Pharmaceuticals 118.2
Sanofi France 1973 Pharmaceuticals 115.4
Schlumberger US 1926 Oil Services & Equipment 111.1
British American 
Tobacco
UK 1902 Tobacco 111
CVS Health US 1996 Drug Retail 110.8
Medtronic US 1949
Medical Equipment & 
Supplies
110.7
Source: Bruegel based on Forbes 2016 and complementary sources. 
Figure 3: Four-step filter for prioritising policies that promise the greatest growth 
potential
Low-carbon technologies remain promising
The low-carbon technology sector is seeing disruptive innovation (Figure 4) and strongly in-
creased investment (Figure 5), which is likely to continue (Figure 6). In addition, the low-car-
bon share of EU exports is increasing (Figure 7). The share of electric vehicle technology 
patents in all patents has increased eightfold since 2000, while it has quadrupled for wind tur-
bines and doubled for photovoltaics. In the same period, the share of exports of wind turbines 
and electric vehicles in global gross exports increased six fold, while export of photovoltaic 
cells increased threefold (despite massively falling prices).
1) Identifying promising sectors
2) Identifying the 
    appropriate regions
3) Identifying the barriers
4) Identify the policies to 
     overcome the barriers
9 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚16 | 2016
Figure 4: Share of certain low-carbon patents in total patents (index: 2000=100)
Source: Bruegel based on OECD.
Figure 5: Global new investment in renewable power and fuels ($ billions)
Source: REN21 (2016).
On the demand side, investment in renewable power and fuels has quadrupled over the 
last decade. And this development is only starting. Global investment in renewable power 
and fuels reached a new record of $286 billion in 2015 (Figure 5). While wind and solar 
power needed big subsidies everywhere 10 years ago, they have started to be competitive 
under specific conditions that are mainly defined by the climatic conditions, the struc-
ture of the incumbent system and local fuel and emissions costs. By 2015, wind and solar 
had become a mainstream option for power generation investment, accounting for more 
than 60 percent of investment in generation capacity globally11. This trend will continue as 
long as technology cost keep falling (which they have massively in the past decade) and/
or countries continue to support renewables to reduce the negative effects of fossil fuels, 
including greenhouse gas emissions. 
The political momentum to combat climate change was reconfirmed and reinforced in 
2015, when for the first time all countries agreed in the Paris Agreement to limit carbon emis-
sions and to aim for carbon neutrality in the second half of the century12. According to most 
current projections, deep decarbonisation will coincide with massive investment in renewable 
11  According to REN21 (2016, footnote 80), 63 gigawatts of wind power, 50 GW of PV, 28 GW of hydro and 3.8 GW of 
other renewable generation were installed in 2015, compared to 42 GW of coal, 40 GW of natural gas and 6.5 GW of 
nuclear.
12  The US and China – which are responsible for 40 percent of global emissions – already formally joined the Paris 
Agreement in September 2016.
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electricity generation and the parallel electrification of transport and heating. Together with 
growing electricity demand in emerging countries, the market for low-carbon energy will 
continue to increase13. But low-carbon technology investment will not be limited to power gen-
eration. Goldman Sachs (Korooshy et al, 2015) estimates the market opportunity for electric 
vehicles and plug-in hybrids to be in the order of $240 billion by 2025. On top of that, there will 
be investment in other areas, such as $200 billion per year in building energy efficiency. The 
International Energy Agency in its 450 ppm scenario – keeping the concentration of green-
house gases below 450 parts per million of CO2 equivalent and hence global warming below 
2°C above preindustrial levels – forecasts a need to ramp up annual investment in wind, solar, 
electric vehicles and carbon sequestration to about $750 billion after 2030 (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Global investment in variable renewables, carbon sequestration (CCS) 
and electric vehicles in the 450 scenario ($ billions, 2013)
Source: IEA (2015).
To illustrate our four-step approach, we picked four technologies deemed essential for 
the low-carbon transition: electric vehicles, batteries, wind turbines and photovoltaic cells. 
All four are tradable; trade in them (apart from batteries) has grown faster than total interna-
tional trade (Figure 7) and patenting activity has also outpaced activity in other areas (Figure 
4). While the four categories do not perfectly fit into past trade and patenting statistics, exist-
ing statistical categories provide quite useful proxies (see Annex 2).
Figure 7: Share of certain low-carbon exports in total global gross exports (index: 
2000=100)
Source: Bruegel based on Comtrade.
13  Low-carbon technologies typically refer to very different types of technology that all compete with high-carbon 
alternatives. Examples are energy generation technologies such as renewables, but also nuclear; energy consumption 
technologies such as clean fuel vehicles, and technologies to make more efficient use of energy such as smart meters.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
Wind and solar PV Electric vehicles and plug-ins CCS
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Electric vehicles Wind motors Batteries Photovoltaic
11 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚16 | 2016
Which countries have a comparative                   
advantage in low-carbon technologies?
We first investigate which countries already have a comparative advantage in our four 
low-carbon technologies. Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) assumes that mar-
ket-based economies reveal their underlying comparative advantages by exporting those 
goods and services in which they are comparatively good14. As open market economies 
would not focus on exporting goods that they are not relatively good at producing, the RCA 
is not only a measure of what a country can sensibly export, but also an indicator of what a 
country is good at producing. The RCA is defined as the share of a good in a country’s overall 
exports, divided by the share in all global exports of global exports of this good. Hence, the 
RCA is more than one if a country exports more of this good than one would expect relative 
to the size of the exports of this country (see Annex). For example, between 2004 and 2009 
Germany, Denmark and Spain exported more than twice as many wind turbines (RCA>2) 
than one would expect from the size of each country’s exports. In contrast, France, Poland, 
Italy and the UK exported less than half (RCA<0.5) as many wind turbines than one would 
expect from the size of each country’s exports.
Box 2: Why exports matter?
Countries that specialise in the production and export of goods associated with higher pro-
ductivity levels perform better in terms of economic growth. Therefore, if a country manages 
to export many goods that are typically exported by highly-productive countries, it is more 
likely to grow (Hausmann et al, 2005).
The use of revealed comparative advantage in defining which goods a country is good at 
producing ensures that country size does not distort the ranking of the different goods under 
consideration. Policymakers should therefore stimulate investments in those sectors that 
show the highest productivity levels, considering also the ‘cost uncertainty’ faced by those en-
trepreneurs that move first into those sectors where the production activity is still unexplored 
(Hausmann et al, 2005).  
When moving into new sectors, countries tend to move to those that are related or ‘near-
by’ the goods in which they already have a comparative advantage, in order to take advantage 
of their current productive structure strengths. This would give an important indication to 
policymakers by showing that the current productive structure is a fundamental factor to 
take into consideration when deciding on moves towards the production of new technologies 
(Barabási et al, 2007).
In the past decade, developments within and outside the EU have changed the compara-
tive advantage of EU countries in the four low-carbon products of interest:
• No change was observed for wind turbines: the comparative advantage enjoyed by Den-
mark, Germany and Spain has been maintained15. 
14  Note that a comparative advantage in a good does not necessarily mean that a country is more productive than 
other countries in producing this good. It only means that relative to all other goods produced by a country, it is better 
at producing this good.
15  Some small countries have highly volatile wind turbine exports: Bulgaria had virtually no exports up to 2010, but 
$190 million in 2011, $14 million 2012 and $500,000 in 2014. Greece’s wind turbine exports stood at $10-20 million up 
to 2010, then $55 million in 2011 and $32 million in 2012.
12 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚16 | 2016
• Poland had a comparative advantage in electric vehicles, which was a very narrow niche 
market in 2004-0916. This comparative advantage vanished when the market grew. Then 
the west European car-making countries – primarily Germany, France, Belgium and Spain, 
but also the UK, the Netherlands and Finland – gained a competitive edge in the emerging 
segment. One interesting case is Slovakia. Slovakia’s electric car exports grew fast: from $12 
million in 2012 to $68 million in 2015. And with Volkswagen, PSA and Kia having major 
operations in Slovakia, the country is by far the global leader in car production per 1000 
inhabitants (178 compared to 68 in Germany). In 2013, the Volkswagen plant in Bratislava 
began to produce the group’s first fully electric-powered vehicle – the Volkswagen e-up! – 
making Slovakia one of the main European producers of electric vehicles.
Figure 8a: EU revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in four product categories, 
2004-09
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade.
16  Melex has been producing electric vehicles for niche applications (golf courses, hotels) in Poland since 1971. 
Poland’s exports in this category were $240 million before 2010, but dropped to $1.4 million in 2011 and thereafter, 
indicating an apparent data issue.
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• The picture is very different for photovoltaic cells. Despite significant support for solar PV 
deployment in many EU countries (most notably the feed-in tariffs in Germany, Italy and 
Spain), none have been able to defend their comparative advantage in this technology. 
The early comparative advantages enjoyed by Germany and the Czech Republic vanished 
after 2010, when Asian suppliers managed to undercut EU production costs. The compar-
ative advantage of Croatia has arguably also vanished, with only one remaining manufac-
turer reported in 201517.
• For batteries the EU as a whole has no comparative advantage. Only Belgium – with a 
global chemical industry cluster (including Umicore and Solvay) – has remained a main 
battery exporter (2005: $750 million; 2010: $720 million; 2015: $640 million)18. Luxem-
bourg seems to have lost its battery exporting business (2005: $46 million, 2010:$3 mil-
lion). The largest Luxembourgish battery producer we found, ACCUMALUX, had by 2010 
outsourced battery production to the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. 
Figure 8b: EU revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in four product categories, 
2010-15
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade.
17  http://www.enfsolar.com/directory/panel/other_europe only reports SOLVIS. Other companies previously re-
ported (http://www.cres.gr/biocogen/pdf/coutries/Croatia.pdf ), such as Solar Cells LTD and SOLARIS, seem to have 
left the market.
18  Also hidden champions such as Prayon – a €700 million turnover phosphate-chemicals company – moved into 
battery technology.
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Which countries might develop a                                    
comparative advantage in low-carbon 
technologies?
In a market economy environment, current strength is a good predictor of future strength 
in producing and exporting certain products. Current strength indicates that crucial factors 
are available and their prices are appropriate, that knowledge and a network of suppliers are 
established and that the regulatory environment is conducive. While having a comparative 
advantage in a product provides some indication that a sector might grow in a country, the 
absence of a revealed comparative advantage does not imply that a country is unable to de-
velop new strengths in the future. One of the building blocks of future comparative advantage 
– especially in new technologies – is innovation. Thus, countries that focus their patenting 
activity on specific technologies are likely to also have a comparative advantage in exporting 
the corresponding products. 
Figure 9a: Technologic specialisation (RTA) and number of patents in four 
technologies 2002-07
Source: Bruegel based on Patstat.
In line with this, we find that some countries that specialised in innovation in certain 
technologies managed to build comparative advantages in these areas. Thereby, the revealed 
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technology advantage (RTA) is the equivalent to the revealed comparative advantage in terms 
of patenting. It is defined as the share of a technology in a country’s overall patents, divided 
by the global share of this technology in all patents. Hence, the RTA is greater than one if a 
country is patenting more in this technology than would be expected from the total number 
of patents from the country (see Annex). 
For example, Greece’s patenting related to wind turbines (RTA>2 in 2002-07 and 2008-
15) was accompanied by a comparative advantage (RCA > 1.1 in 2010-15). As many factors 
influence the development of competitiveness (eg deployment and presence of similar tech-
nologies – see Huberty and Zachmann, 2011) and companies that produce/export a certain 
product are also more likely to generate patents in this area, we cannot establish causality. 
But, RCA and RTA are complementary indicators for the potential of future competitiveness. 
Figure 9b: Technologic specialisation (RTA) and number of patents in four 
technologies 2008-13
Source: Bruegel based on Patstat.
In some low-carbon technology areas such as batteries and photovoltaics, the number 
of patents is high, because they are types of technology for which there is more patenting, 
commercial interest in the technologies are high and the categories are broadly defined. In 
electric vehicle and wind turbines, much less patenting occurs, though EU member states 
have embarked more on specialisation in the latter fields. 
Patenting data is no perfect measure for innovative activity. It only measures a specific 
step in the innovation process and, because patents are a legal instrument to enforce intellec-
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tual property, they are only applied for if an inventor requires this protection. Not all innova-
tion is patented. However, companies might also decide to patent very minor technological 
improvements in order to enjoy protection for their intellectual property. Thus the quality of 
patents can be quite variable19.
As expected, countries that are good at exporting certain products are often also good at 
patenting in related technologies.
• For electric vehicles, we find that almost all EU countries significantly increased the 
number of patents in electric propulsion technology. This helped France and Germany 
keep pace with the growing patenting field and develop a comparative advantage in ex-
porting electric vehicles. Romania is also responsible for relatively more patents in electric 
propulsion than in other technology fields but is yet to develop a comparative advantage 
at exporting electric vehicles20. Finally Austria managed to develop a revealed advantage 
in electric propulsion technology by significantly increasing its number of patents from 83 
in 2002-07 to 216 in 2008-13. 
• With a few notable exemptions, most EU countries have a technology advantage in wind 
turbines. This is even true for countries such as the UK, which were not strong exporters 
of wind turbines. Many central and eastern European countries also patent more than 
twice as much in wind turbines than their small number of total patents would suggest. 
Then there are the global wind powerhouses Denmark, Germany and Spain, which 
together accounted for 37 percent of worldwide wind turbine patents from 2000-13. The 
most notable exception is France, which has only filed about half as many patents as the 
average country in wind turbines, relative to its overall patenting activity. The Nether-
lands, Belgium, Sweden and Finland also do not focus on wind turbines. 
• The picture is completely different for battery technology. No EU country has a revealed 
technology advantage – not even Belgium, which does quite well exporting batteries. The 
reason is the dominance of Japan (RTA = 2.11) and South Korea (RTA = 1.89), which both 
have twice as many batteries patents as one would expect from their overall patenting 
activity. Furthermore, thanks to their patenting legislation and sectoral focus21 Japan and 
South Korea are among the strongest patent producers in the world. Japan has 14 percent 
and Korea 8 percent of all patents considered (by comparison France accounts for 5 per-
cent).
• But even if these two battery patent powerhouses are excluded from the analysis, the only 
EU country that has an above-average share of battery patents in total patents is Germany 
(RTA = 1.25), while other overseas countries (notably China RTA = 1.26) are much more 
specialised in this emerging technology field.
• Photovoltaic technology patents illustrate well that our RTA measure does not capture 
absolute patent numbers, but countries’ relative specialisations. Germany and France 
generate many photovoltaic patents – many more than for wind turbines – but that is 
largely because the patent category is much wider. The photovoltaic patents category ac-
counts for 4 percent of global patents, while wind turbines accounts for only 0.08 percent. 
19  The use of additional data sources and patent quality indicators (such as citations) is warranted to increase the 
reliability of the analysis. This, however, often implies working very far from real time – because the quality of a patent 
is only revealed over time. This calls for improved innovation statistics at EU level, for example through a European 
energy information service, which would collect and administer energy innovation statistics. 
20  Given the small number of patents produced by Romania, these numbers have to be interpreted with caution, as a 
relative technology advantage (RTA>1) is already driven by an absolute number of only 29 electric propulsion patents 
over 6 years.
21  Japan’s patent figures are likely to be inflated by the greater tendency to patent incremental innovations and by 
double counting, as well as the concentration in Japan of patenting-intensive sectors, such as manufacturing and, in 
particular, electronics. See ‘Mother of invention – Why is Japan the source of so many bright ideas?’ The Economist, 3 
August 2007.
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So although between 2008 and 2013 France has produced 8,647 patents and Germany 
25,161, no EU country has a revealed technology advantage in this technology class. The 
most specialised countries are Indonesia (RTA = 2.78), Taiwan (RTA = 2.37), South Korea 
(RTA = 2.36) and Japan (RTA = 2.01), while interestingly China is under-specialised in this 
category (RTA = 0.52).
• Even if the top-four Asian countries are dropped from the sample, only the Netherlands 
(RTA = 1.48) and Austria (RTA = 1.18) have an advantage in the photovoltaics technology 
category. The strong Dutch position is partly explained by the strong position of Philips, 
which applied for at least a fifth of the patents in this category22. Despite massive solar 
subsidies, Germany has not strongly specialised in photovoltaic technology innovation 
(RTA = 0.59). Interestingly, China is also responsible for only about half as many patents in 
solar PV as would be expected for a country with China’s number of patent applications.
Figure 10: Technology specialisation in related technologies 2000-13
Source: Bruegel based on Patstat.
22  Including in lighting technology because the PV category H01L also includes LEDs. A quick inspection of the only 
partly-cleaned data shows that Philips applied for about 7000 of around 36,000 patents that included the H01L tech-
nology code in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2013.
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Almost all EU countries are, in global terms, disproportionally innovative in either electric 
vehicles and/or wind turbines, while almost no EU country has a technology advantage in 
battery and photovoltaic technology. But this picture could change because countries can 
alter the focus of their innovative activity23. We want to determine which countries might have 
some of the prerequisites for developing an advantage in the four technologies of interest.
We build on the fact that countries find it easier to innovate in technologies that are 
related to technologies they are already good at24. As a measure of technology proximity, 
we use the relative frequency with which two technology classes (in fact technology codes) 
appear as part of the same patent (for more information see Annex 4). We then analyse which 
countries are good at patenting the technologies we identified as being ‘nearby’ our four 
low-carbon technologies (for more information see Annex 5).
To give one example, to establish Slovakia’s potential for wind turbine innovation, we look 
at the two most-related technologies, namely ‘machines or engines for liquids’ and ‘control 
or regulation of electric motors’. We find that the potential RTA of Slovakia for wind turbines is 
rather high, because it is already specialised in the two nearby technologies. In fact, Slovakia 
is also already specialised in wind turbines. 
In general we find that countries that specialise in nearby technologies are already also 
specialised in the low-carbon technology of interest – somewhat validating our approach. The 
interesting cases are, however, those countries that are good at innovating in nearby technol-
ogies, but which have not yet developed a specialisation in the technology of interest.
• For wind turbines, Denmark, Germany and Spain (but also Greece and Bulgaria) have 
revealed comparative advantages and revealed technology advantages, and also have 
revealed technology advantages in related technologies. Austria, Slovakia, Portugal, and 
Poland have both a revealed technology advantage in wind turbines and a revealed tech-
nology advantage in related technologies. The Czech Republic and the UK so far have not 
excelled in patenting and exporting wind turbines – but the specialisation in innovation in 
nearby technologies suggests that some of the technological prerequisites for strengthen-
ing innovation in wind technology are present.
• While currently European countries are at best modestly focused on innovation in electric 
vehicles (RTA in Germany = 1.38), many countries are doing well in related fields. We 
find that several of the big car-producing countries (Spain, France, Germany, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia) perform well in technologies close to electric propulsion. The most 
notable exception is Italy, which does not seem to have great potential in electric propul-
sion. At the same time, even Austria, Romania and Bulgaria are focusing their (sometimes 
small) innovation activity on related technologies. Many EU countries seem thus to have 
some of the technological prerequisites for developing a competitive edge in generating 
electric propulsion patents.
• For photovoltaic cells, the initial finding – that EU countries are neither good at exporting 
nor at patenting photovoltaic cells – is largely confirmed. Only the Netherlands (possibly 
partly because of the activities of Philips in the LED segment) and Romania are relatively 
strong at patenting technologies that are close to photovoltaic cells. 
• For batteries the picture is even less encouraging – no EU country is strong in patenting 
battery technology or in technologies close to battery technology. 
23  For example, Austria developed a technology advantage in electric propulsion and Ireland in wind turbines 
between 2002-07 and 2008-13.
24  For a recent discussion on different measures of technology proximity see Alstott et al (2016).
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Which regions might develop a comparative 
advantage in low-carbon technologies?
Innovative activity is not evenly distributed within countries. It largely follows the concen-
tration of industrial activity. Consequently, patent data is helpful data in identifying regional 
industrial strengths (clusters). The advantage over other types of data is that patent data is 
available for concrete locations (the address of the applicant), with a narrowly categorised 
technology description (the IPC code). The data is also rather consistent over many years. To 
properly analyse patent data we applied a machine-learning algorithm (Peruzzi et al, 2014) 
to attribute individual patents to companies, to categorise the inventors into different types 
(companies, individuals, universities) and to locate the inventors. This was done by combin-
ing the sometimes sketchy patent data with the comprehensive up-to-date company database 
Orbis. The algorithm in general works very well in attributing 2.6 million patents to about 
150,000 inventors and fixing a location for 1.5 million of the patents. 
When we plot the location of patents in our four technology categories, significant 
regional clusters emerge. For electric vehicles in France, for example, the automotive 
clusters around Lyon (Renault), Paris (PSA and Renault) and Lille (Renault) stand out. 
These innovative clusters feature large companies and also smaller competitors and an 
ecosystem of suppliers. In Germany, the entire south-west (Daimler, Porsche, Bosch), 
the Ruhr (Opel, Mercedes, Ford) and the area around Munich (Audi, BMW, Siemens) are 
clusters of electric propulsion innovation. 
For wind turbines the three largest innovation cluster are Midtjylland (Denmark: 
Vestas, Siemens), Hamburg (Germany: Nordex, Senvion) and Oviedo (Spain: EDP Reno-
váveis). But we also observe numerous smaller clusters of wind turbine innovation in 
other parts of Germany and Spain, and in the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands.
Not completely unexpectedly, the clustering of innovative activity related to bat-
teries matches the innovation clusters for electric propulsion, with the addition of a 
cluster south of Berlin (the Daimler subsidiary Li-Tec Batteries in Kamenz25) and around 
London. In contrast to the country view there appear to be several smaller innovation 
hubs on a regional level that might develop further.
Among our four technologies, photovoltaic innovation appears least densely clus-
tered, with a large number of small clusters across western Europe. This might partly be 
because the photovoltaic technology category is broadly defined – but could also be a 
consequence of the industry structure, which consists of more smaller-scale companies 
than the car or the wind industries.
Clusters matter
Regional clusters of patenting activity in certain technology areas are not just a result of 
clustered industrial activity. They also point to innovation spillovers – the most fascinating 
example being Silicon Valley26.
To understand the importance of geographic spillovers for our four technologies, we 
analysed the distance between inventors and other patents cited in our patents. Such cita-
tions, which identify significant previous patents on which the new patent builds, are part of 
patent filings. Our findings are in line with the literature27, indicating a strong concentration of 
spillovers within clusters. For all four technologies, between a quarter and a half of the cited 
25  https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li-Tec_Battery. But Li-Tec might also serve as a warning. Despite public support 
and strong initial investment, production was stopped in 2015. Because of its location, Li-Tec was unable to build on a 
cluster in similar or nearby technologies or a strong academic research centre focusing on corresponding technolo-
gies.
26  http://www.grips.ac.jp/r-center/wp-content/uploads/12-18.pdf.
27  For a summary of the literature see Carlino and Kerr (2014).
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patents are applied for by person or company whose address is less than 50 kilometres away 
from the address given in cited relevant patents28. Innovators tend to climb on the shoulders 
of nearby giants. 
Figure 11: Regional clusters of innovation 2000-13
Source: Bruegel based on PATSTAT. Note: In the map that plots absolute numbers of patents, the con-
centration of low-carbon research activity in particular countries/regions appears even stronger than in 
the RTA maps (Figure 9). This is mainly because before we plotted the specialisations (RTA) of countries, 
which implies that a country can be good at a certain low-carbon technology even if it does not produce 
many patents in this technology class, just because it does produce very little patents overall (so its spe-
cialisation in this low-carbon technology is nevertheless high)
28  Compared to the academic literature, such as Jaffe et al (1993), Carlino et al (2012) and Murata et al (2014), we do 
not control for self-citation and other characteristics, and thus potentially overestimate the spillover effects, which 
those papers also found.
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Figure 12: Histogram of geographic distance to other patents cited in patent 
applications
Source: Bruegel based on Patstat.
Conclusion
Europe’s business model of selling more of the same in new markets is reaching its limits as 
the pace at which new markets emerge slows, while new competitors that sell the same prod-
ucts emerge quickly. One strategy to restore economic growth in Europe would be to embark 
on exporting new products that promise higher value added and growing markets. One such 
area could be low-carbon technologies. In the framework of global decarbonisation and the 
desire to reduce resource consumption, the market for low-carbon technologies has been 
growing fast – and is likely to continue to do so. 
In terms of European potential we assessed different criteria: 
1. Strength of current exports
Strong exports are a powerful signal that a country is (relatively) better at producing 
certain goods or services. Different EU countries already have comparative advantages in a 
number of low-carbon technologies. For example Denmark, Germany and Spain are major 
exporters of wind turbines. 
2. Strength of current innovation 
Other EU countries might have the potential to develop comparative advantages based on 
their specialisation in innovation in these new fields. For example, Germany is already strong 
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in patenting electric vehicle technology and might turn this into a comparative advantage. 
3. Innovation strength in nearby technologies
The Czech Republic and the UK have so far not excelled in patenting and exporting wind 
turbines – but their specialisation in innovation in nearby technologies suggests that some of 
the technological prerequisites for strengthening innovation in wind technology and ulti-
mately boosting exports are present. Although modest in absolute terms, some central and 
east European countries exhibit specialisation in technologies related to electric vehicles and 
photovoltaic cells. 
4. Regional clusters
Finally we find that – while only Belgium is good at exporting batteries and no EU country 
is good at inventing batteries – several regional clusters exist that are generating significant 
battery technology patents. These clusters might be the nuclei of future growth.
We can therefore conclude that the EU has potential, but that one-size-fits-all policies 
would ignore the complexity of the task of supporting the EU economy to gain a competitive 
edge in new products and services that will form the basis for future growth and jobs. To 
identify policies to foster future competitiveness we suggest a four-step filter (Figure 3), with 
each step, as much as possible, based on transparent criteria. This would also enable ex-post 
evaluation – which in the medium term allows the policy toolbox to be improved. 
This paper contributes to two steps of the economic policy menu: first, providing some 
criteria for selecting technologies that have economic potential, and second providing quan-
titative criteria to identify regional strengths in selected technologies. Obviously, both steps 
could be substantially refined and ‘policy learning’ is an important element of developing 
successful economic policy. Two subsequent crucial steps have not been addressed here. 
We neither discussed how to identify bottlenecks that hold up the development of individual 
technologies in individual regions (Zachmann, 2012) nor did we provide tools for the com-
parison and cost-benefit analysis of different policies to address those bottlenecks.
The approach and criteria we have outlined could already inform the Energy Union 
Integrated Research, Innovation and Competitiveness Strategy (EURICS), though more 
criteria than what we have presented need to be considered. Even then, the approach will not 
guarantee success in each and every case. But this is not a bad thing when targeting disrup-
tive sectoral change. Rather than supporting technologies in regions that will be guaranteed 
successes, policymakers should also take calculated risks. In that sense, funding should be 
based more on a venture capital model –the failures of four risky endeavours can be more 
than compensated for by the success of one risky but successful endeavour. But each failure 
should also be used to learn.
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Annex 1: RTA-RCA methodology
We use data visualisation tools29 to draw the cross-sectional distribution of RTAs/RCAs of 
selected technologies/exported goods across EU28 countries over the period 2002-15. To this 
end, we use OECD Science, Technology and Patents count data30, by browsing patent statistics 
by technology and then downloading the data by International Patent Classification (IPC) 
section31 for a selected set of countries over 2000-13, and UN COMTRADE data, by searching 
gross exports in goods for all countries over 2004-15.
In this exercise, we consider OECD Science, Technology and Patents count and UN 
COMTRADE data. As regards the first, we browse patent statistics by technology and then 
download the data by International Patent Classification (IPC) section, ie from A to H. We do 
this for a selected32 set of countries, ie EU28 countries in addition to the US and Japan, over 
the period 2000-13. In addition to the country-time filter, we slice the data according to other 
three dimensions: reference date, patents office and reference country. We set the reference 
date to be the priority date, meaning that the date “corresponds to the first filing worldwide 
and therefore closest to the invention date”, as explained by the OECD. We use this date since 
“to measure inventive activity, patent should be counted according to the priority date (in the 
case of patent families, the priority date corresponds to the earliest priority among the set of 
patents)”, as suggested again by the OECD. We set then the patents’ office to be the patent 
applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), ie those “patents filed under 
the PCT, at international phase, that designate the European Patent Office (EPO)”, since the 
OECD bases its RTA computation on this definition. Finally, we set the reference country to 
be the inventor(s)’s country(ies) of residence mainly because “counting patents according to 
the inventor’s country of residence is the most relevant for measuring the technological innova-
tiveness of researchers and laboratories located in a given country”, as suggested by the OECD. 
We automatically import and append the resulting databases into a unique dataset of patents 
count for all IPC codes ready for RTAs computation and visualization. A patent is equally 
attributed to all inventors’ countries. This method of simple counts is in contrast to the frac-
tional counts employed by the OECD whereby patents are counted as fractions relative to the 
number of inventors. Simple counts produce more stable RTA measures but totals are affected 
by increasing internationalisation. 
The same procedure has been applied to the UN COMTRADE database, with few differ-
ences. We download gross exports values measured in USD for all countries since the filter 
involving EU28, US and Japan only does not capture many other big exporters. We do this 
for a selected set of commodity codes (see Annex 2), namely electric vehicles, wind motors, 
batteries and photovoltaic cells, which we will use then as additional criterion to slice the 
patent database. We apply several filters: we choose exports from all countries to the ‘world’ 
measured at annual frequency and classifying HS as reported.
Following the OECD definition33 of RTA, “the RTA index provides an indication of the 
relative specialisation of a given country in selected technological domains and is based on 
patent applications filed under the PCT. It is defined as a country’s share of patents in a 
particular technology field divided by the country’s share in all patent fields. The index is 
equal to zero when the country holds no patent in a given sector; is equal to one when the 
country’s share in the sector equals its share in all fields (no specialisation); and above one 
when a positive specialisation is observed”. We employ this definition in our exploratory 
analysis. Indeed, letting  be the number of patents in technology  in country  at time , the 
29  R software for statistical computing.
30  http://stats.oecd.org/ and http://comtrade.un.org/data/.
31  http://web2.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/ipcpub/#refresh=page.
32  The selection criterion is guided by patent data relevance and reliability for this study.
33  http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/data/oecd-science-technology-and-industry-outlook/
revealed-technology-advantage-in-selected-fields_data-00673-en.
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RTA index is expressed as:
If we switch the terms  and , the RTA index could be also defined as a technology’s share in 
a given country divided by the technology’s share in all countries. Given their equivalence, 
the two definitions are therefore complementary. As the OECD definition emphasises, the 
RTA index has domain:
That is, the index is equal to zero when the country holds no patent in a given technology; 
is equal to one when the country’s share in the sector equals its share in all fields (no special-
isation); and above one when a positive specialisation is observed. We aggregate therefore 
by summing the number of patents first and then re-compute the RTA index with the new 
aggregated data for two selected periods, 2002-07 and 2008-13. Letting , the aggregate RTA 
index is given by:
In this way we are able to reduce the dimensionality of the index, while increasing the 
observations used in computing and visualizing the index. 
We then repeat the procedure for RCA, which is defined as a country’s share of exports in 
a particular good divided by the country’s share in all commodities. The index is equal to zero 
when the country holds no export in a given good; is equal to one when the country’s share in 
the commodity equals its share in all fields (no specialisation); and above one when a positive 
specialisation is observed. Letting  be the value of gross exports in commodity  in country  
at time , the RCA index is expressed similarly and has the same domain as the RTA index. 
We then aggregate over time for period 2004-09 and 2010-15. We lag our aggregation of the 
RCA index compared to the RTA index because we assume there could be a lagged relation 
between the two measures, possibly being innovation engines of comparative advantage.
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Annex 2: IPC and HS codes used to measure 
the selected products
IPC code Description HS code Description Short name
B60L Propulsion of 
electrically-
propelled vehicles 
 870390 Automobiles including 
gas turbine powered
Electric 
vehicles
F03D Wind motors 850231 Wind-powered 
generating
Wind turbines
H01M Processes or 
means, eg batteries, 
for the direct 
conversion of 
chemical energy 
into electrical 
energy
8506 Primary cells and 
primary batteries
Batteries
H01L Semiconductor 
devices; electric 
solid state devices 
not otherwise 
provided for 
854140 Photosensitive/
photovoltaic/LED 
semiconductor devices 
Photovoltaic
Annex 3: One way of determining related 
technologies
To identify the potential strengths of a country we assume that strength in one technology 
implies the potential for development in a related technology. Thus we first identify which 
technologies are related. To do this we exploit 15.7 million patents from 2000-14 in 45 coun-
tries (EU countries and G20 countries). We first assume that IPC codes (ie the technology 
categories ascribed to a patent by the patent officer) that often occur together on one patent 
are more likely to be related, than IPC codes that are rarely together on one patent. To do this 
we built a table with 15.7 million rows for each patent and around 623 columns for each IPC 
code34. We then calculated the concurrence of two IPC codes by matrix-multiplying the table 
with itself. The elements of the resulting 623 x 623 matrix can be interpreted as the number 
of times a combination of the column-IPC and the row-IPC appear in one patent. So the 
second element of the matrix corresponds to the number of times A01B and A01C appear on 
the same patent, 57,144 times. As self-concurrence is not meaningful, we replace the main 
diagonal (where the row and the column IPC are the same) of the square matrix with zeros. 
Then we divide each element of the matrix by the sum of all elements. Hence, the sum of the 
resulting matrix is one, and each element is the share of this combination of IPCs in the total 
number of combinations of IPCs. This share does not directly allow us to infer which combi-
nations of IPC codes are related as some IPC codes are far more likely than others. The most 
frequent IPC code A61K appears 15.2 million times in patents, while the least frequent IPC 
code C06F only appears 228 times in patens. Hence, the share of IPC combinations involving 
A61K is naturally much higher. So to spot relations, we for each combination of IPC codes 
34  The entries in the table are not necessarily zero-one, as the same IPC code might appear several times on a patent 
because we shrink the more detailed IPC codes (such as F03D 3/0427 and F03D 9/37) to four digits (eg F03D).
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control for the frequency of the two IPC codes that form this combination. To do this, we 
calculate the expected share of each combination of IPC codes by multiplying the frequency 
of the first and the second IPC code (eg for C06F and A61K there should be 3.5 billion com-
binations). We than again delete the main diagonal and divide each element by the sum of 
all elements. We now have two matrices: one matrix with the observed share of each combi-
nation and one with the expected share of each combination (if they were solely distributed 
according to the frequency of the forming IPC codes). Based on the two we can assess which 
combinations of IPC codes occur more often than expected by subtracting the expected share 
from the observed share and dividing the difference by the expected share. This can be rep-
resented as a heatmap. The heatmap illustrates that IPC codes are more likely to concur with 
IPC codes that are classified close to them (ie that share the same first two digits), as the areas 
of high concurrence are close to the main diagonal. We name the elements of the matrix the 
‘relationship coefficient’ between the IPC codes.
Similar concurrence tables can be established for the most likely combinations of IPC 
codes applied by the same person and the most likely combinations of IPC codes by appli-
cants of the same country.
Figure 13: Concurrence of technology (IPC) codes on the same patent application
Source: Bruegel based on Patstat.
Annex 4: Strength in related technologies
Proximity between different technologies can be exploited to explore which additional tech-
nology strength a country might develop based on existing strength. The idea is that countries 
are more likely to also develop strength in technologies that are close to technologies the 
country is already good at. Based on the above-introduced concurrence tables we identify a 
set of technologies that are close to our technologies of interest. We chose all technologies 
that are among the 5 percent technologies with the highest relation to our technology of 
interest. For them, we normalize the relation-coefficients for these technologies, so that the 
sum of the relation-coefficients of the related technologies is equal to 1. Then we calculate 
the weighted average of each country’s RTAs in the related technologies. We use a weighted 
geometric average, as RTA’s follow a logarithmic distribution. The result is a proximity-weight-
ed average of the related RTA’s, which we interpret as the potential RTA for the technology of 
interest. To give one example, to find out the potential in wind engine innovation (F03D) in 
Slovakia, we identify the nearby technologies of wind engines. The two most related are F03B 
‘machines or engines for liquids’ with a relation coefficient of 124 and H02P ‘control or regu-
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lation of electric motors’ with a relation coefficient of 57. If we only consider those two related 
technologies, their normalised coefficients are 124/181 and 57/181. As the RTA of F03B and 
H02P in Slovakia are 10.6 and 0.5, the potential F03D RTA is (10.6^(124/181)*0.5^(57/181)) 
= 4.1. So the potential RTA of Slovakia for wind motors is rather high, as it is already special-
ised in two nearby technologies. In fact, Slovakia also already specialised in wind motors 
(RTA=2.3).
But this also means that if a country does not innovate at all (RTA=0) in one of the nearby 
technologies – it is considered unlikely to excel in the technology of interest (pRTA=0). Our 
approach allows for a high degree of discretion. The definition of the relation coefficients 
(number of digits of the IPC code considered, concurrence on the same patent or by the same 
person), the number of nearby technologies considered and how they are weighted – all this 
can be determined by the user. Thus we try to carefully document our choices. At this point, 
calibration is still ad hoc – based on intuition and results for some technologies/countries 
being in line with the priors of the author – at a later stage some data-based calibration would 
be desirable.
Annex 5: China’s move up the value chain
Figure 14: China’s move from lower to higher value goods
 
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade.
Figure 14 illustrates how the share of lower value goods (bicycles) in Chinese exports has 
fallen, while the share of medium value goods (motorcycles) peaked in 2008, and the share of 
higher value goods (vehicles) continued to increase.
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